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MARGINAL UTILITY AND THE COASE
THEOREM
Herbert Hovenkampt
I
INTRODUCTION: STRONG AND WEAK COASE THEORIES
Perhaps the single greatest intellectual event in the modem law
& economics movement was the 1960 publication of Ronald Coase's
The Problem of Social Cost,' a rare article that has become a landmark
in the disciplines of both law and economics.
The Coase theorem can be stated in a number of ways. One
perhaps most familiar to lawyers is something like this: "When bar-
gaining costs are zero, the initial assignment of legal entitlements
does not affect the efficiency of the resulting allocation of re-
sources."' 2 A more generalized version that applies in the presence
of transactions costs is "The initial assignment of a legal entitlement
does not affect the efficiency of the resulting allocation of resources,
provided that the costs of bargaining are less than the difference in
value that the bargaining parties place on the entitlement."
Suppose that the use of noisy equipment is worth $100 to a
confectioner but causes $90 in injury to a neighboring physician.3
The efficient allocation of resources is continued operation of the
confectioner's machinery, for this creates $100 in value at a cost of
only $90. If the court forced the confectioner to stop using the ma-
chinery, the collective wealth of the two parties would be $10 less.
If no one else is affected by the injunction, the "social cost" as well
as the private cost would be $10-i.e., society as a whole would be
$10 poorer.
But the Coase theorem says that the efficient allocation, contin-
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). The article is
reprinted as ch. 5, pp. 95-156, in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE
LAw (1988). Citations are to the latter. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 19 (3d ed. 1986) (on importance of Coase article to origin of law and economics
movement).
2 Cf Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27
(1959) ("the delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transactions; but the
ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal
decision."); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12
(1983) ("If there are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of
the choice of legal rule.").
3 See Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch.D. 852 (1879); R. COASE, supra note 1, at 105-06.
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ued operation of the confectioner's equipment, will result whether
or not the confectioner is held liable in nuisance, provided that the
costs of striking a bargain are less than $10. If the confectioner is
liable, he will be willing to pay bargaining costs of, say, $8 plus an
additional $91 to the physician to continue operating the machinery,
and both confectioner and physician will be $1 better off. If the con-
fectioner is not liable, the physician will be willing to pay the confec-
tioner only $90 to stop using the machinery, but the confectioner
will be unwilling to accept anything less than $100. Once again, the
confectioner will continue operating the machinery.
The efficient result will not necessarily obtain if transaction
costs exceed $10. If the confectioner is found liable and transaction
costs are $15, the confectioner must pay the physician at least $90
plus the $15 in transaction costs before the physician will agree to
permit the machinery to operate. But the confectioner is unwilling
to pay more than $100.
The Coase theorem can also be stated more technically, as it
was by George Stigler in 1966: "under perfect competition private
and social costs will be equal." 4 Coase himself observes that the
"perfect competition" qualifier is unnecessary. A more technically
correct statement is "with zero transaction costs, private and social
costs will be equal."5 This formulation is another way of stating that
social cost is nothing more than the sum of all private costs (includ-
ing transaction costs). Social costs exceed private costs only when
the costs of producing a bargain are so high that the market is un-
able to yield an efficient outcome. This might occur because there
are too many bargainers, or the bargainers have imperfect informa-
tion about relevant facts or the applicable law, or perhaps because
they have opportunities to behave strategically. For example, if
someone proposes to build a refining plant in a residential area, and
the plant's smoke will injure 10,000 home owners, but each rather
slightly, the costs of bargaining might prevent the plant owner from
compensating the 10,000 for their losses (assuming the plant owner
is liable), even though the value of operating the plant is greater
than the losses imposed on the 10,000 home owners. Likewise, if
the liability rule is uncertain and the parties have differing concep-
tions about what it is (e.g., each thinks the other is legally obliged to
bear the loss), then they will be less likely to strike a bargain and
more likely to go to court. The court system is generally much more
expensive than private bargaining.
The Coase theorem assumes that the legal entitlements at issue
are alienable-i.e., that the parties are free to contract around liabil-
4 GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
5 R. COASE, supra note 1, at 158.
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ity or no-liability rules. Regulatory intervention that creates inaliena-
ble entitlements-for example, zoning that prohibits a refinery from
building a plant whether or not the neighbors can be bought off-
will not necessarily produce the efficient outcome. 6
The Coase theorem can be said to consist of two sub-theses, or
corollaries, an "efficiency" thesis and an "invariance" thesis. The
efficiency thesis simply says that in the absence of transaction costs
and externalities, 7 two bargainers will achieve a Pareto efficient re-
sult. In general, this means that they will achieve a result that maxi-
mizes their joint wealth. The invariance thesis says that in the
absence of transaction costs, the initial assignment of a transferable
right will not determine who ends up with the right: the result will
be the same no matter who received it to begin with. The most ac-
curate statements of the Coase theorem include both theses. For
example, Donald Regan's statement is that ".... in a world of perfect
competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, [1] the
allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and [2] will
be unaffected by legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs re-
sulting from externalities." 8 In this case, [1] states the efficiency
thesis and [2] the invariance thesis. Stating separate conditions of
perfect information and zero transaction costs is unnecessary, since
imperfect information is merely a kind of transaction cost.
The efficiency thesis and the invariance thesis do not necessar-
ily stand or fall together. One might agree that private bargaining
will generally produce efficient results, but deny that bargaining will
produce the same efficient result regardless of how an entitlement is
initially assigned.9 For example, the initial assignment of an entitle-
ment may have wealth effects that ultimately will change the allocation
of resources. The result of a change in a legal rule that formerly
made ranchers liable to farmers for trespassing cattle but now places
the loss on farmers is that the costs of ranching declines while the
cost of farming rises. If both markets are competitive, we would ex-
pect a certain amount of entry into the ranching market and a cer-
tain amount of exit from the farming market. The result: when the
liability rule changes the amount of activity changes as well.
For all its notoriety, 10 both economists and those engaged in
6 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
7 I.e., effects on people who are not parties to the bargain.
8 Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 427, 427
(1972).
9 See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 1IJ. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1982).
10 See Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not,
87 Micn. L. REV. 1171, 1189 (1989) (noting that as of that publication date The Problem of
Social Cost was cited in 1109 articles listed in the Social Science Index); see also Fred R.
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law and economics have had some difficulty characterizing the
Coase theorem. Is it an empirical proposition? Is it a tautology? Is
it a normative proposition (i.e., neither purely descriptive nor purely
analytic) that disguises an underlying bias against state interference
in the market? A fair amount of literature, mainly on the left, argues
that the Coase theorem is simply a normative statement reflecting a
bias against State intervention in the free market. I1 A second body
of literature begins with the premise that the Coase theorem is an
empirical statement, and is therefore subject to verification or falsifi-
cation. This literature examines real-world or hypothetical markets
in order to determine whether the results that occur tend to support
or undermine the theorem's predictions. 12
A third argument is that the Coase theorem can be stated in two
versions. A "strong version," which treats its claims as logically nec-
essary, is that bargains invariably yield the results the theorem de-
scribes. A weaker version, which must be characterized as empirical,
treats the theorem as a prediction that private bargaining will gener-
ally, but perhaps not invariably, yield these results. As Stewart
Schwab notes, theorems are tautological; thus this weaker version is
not really a "theorem" at all.13
Such discussions of the scientific status of the Coase theorem
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540, 1546 (1985) (noting
that the Coase article is clearly among the most cited although it was excluded from this
study since it was published in an interdisciplinary journal).
11 E.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1975); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Donald
H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and its Relationship to Modern Legal Thought,
35 BUFFALO L. REV. 871 (1986); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?,
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 906, 911-12 (1980); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673-78 (1979); see also
Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IowA L. REV. 577
(1987). But see Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost:
A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919 (arguing that although Coase's original article
was more-or-less noncommittal on ideological questions, it has been "captured" by the
right wing of the law and economics movement).
12 E.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Glenn W. Harrison & Michael Mckee, Experi-
mental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem, 28 J.L. & ECON. 653 (1985); Elizabeth Hoffinan &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects'
Concepts of Distributive justice, 14 J. LEGAL. STUD. 259 (1985) [hereinafter Hoffman &
Spitzer, Entitlements]; Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some
Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & EcON. 73 (1982) [hereinafter Hoffhian & Spitzer, The Coase
Theorem]; Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17J. LEGAL STUD.
237 (1988); see also John Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce
Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE LJ. 549, 549 (1989) (suggesting that the value of the Coase
Theorem depends on "the extent to which [it] is empirically validated."); GeorgeJ. Stig-
ler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 99 YALE LJ. 631, 631 (1989) (suggesting that the
"logic" of the Coase Theorem is not testable, but its domain might be); Kenneth R.
Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1987).
13 See Schwab, supra note 10, at 1176.
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generally fail to disaggregate the statement of the theorem from its
premises. The theorem appears to be genuinely deduced from its
premises-namely, freely alienable entitlements, zero transaction
costs, no wealth effects, and profit maximizing actors. If the prem-
ises are true in any given situation, the Coase theorem must predict
the result. Thus it is easy to make too much of the distinction be-
tween strong and weak versions of the Coase theorem. Failure of
the Coase theorem to account for a real world outcome is simply an
observation that (1) an entitlement is not freely alienable; (2) trans-
action costs are higher than anticipated; (3) the actors are not profit-
maximizers; or (4) wealth effects undermine the invariance thesis-
i.e., in a given situation one of the premises does not obtain.
For example, the Pythagorean theorem states that the square of
the hypotenuse of a right triangle equals the sum of the squares of
the two legs. We do not speak of "strong" and "weak" versions of
the Pythagorean theorem simply because some of the things that we
encounter in the real world that have been characterized as right
triangles do not precisely measure up. The weak version would be
"Most of the time the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle
equals the sum of the squares of the two legs." Rather, we check
our real world triangle for evidence that (1) it is not precisely a right
triangle; or (2) it is not a triangle at all because one of the three
sides is slightly curved or has a kink.
I believe the Coase theorem can and should be stated as a theo-
rem (strong version) rather than an empirical proposition (weak ver-
sion), 14 although as stated in the literature cited above one of its
premises is missing. I would modify Don Regan's statement to say
"in a world of zero transaction costs, and no wealth effects, the allo-
cation of resources in the economy will be efficient and will be unaf-
fected by legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs resulting
from externalities." Zero transaction costs implies perfect informa-.
tion, since imperfect information is simply a cost of bargaining. The
assumption of no wealth effects is necessary because, as Regan him-
self notes, in the long run cost-shifting rule changes will cause in-
vestment in the side of the market where costs are reduced, and
divestment from that side where costs are increased. As is argued
below, the possibility of strategic bargaining, much discussed in the
literature, does not undermine this statement of the theorem. 15
Inefficient strategic bargaining is simply inconsistent with the as-
sumptions of perfect information and zero transaction costs.
14 For statements that the Coase theorem is tautological, see Guido Calabresi,
Transactions Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcON. 67, 68
(1968); Vogel, supra note 12, at 186.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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If the Coase theorem is indeed a theorem, then it does not
come in a "weak" version. As a result, one cannot conduct empiri-
cal "tests" of the Coase theorem-no more than one could conduct
empirical tests of the Pythagorean theorem. A supposed empirical
test of the Coase theorem is nothing other than a test of the degree
to which one or more of its premises obtains or fails to obtain in a
particular situation.
Treating the Coase theorem as an empirical proposition creates
another problem. At least one of its assumptions-namely, that rel-
evant actors seek to maximize profits-may not itself be capable of
empirical verification, and probably must be classified as normative.
Some writers have attributed failures of the Coase theorem to pre-
dict real world outcomes to high transaction costs. I argue below
that failure of the relevant actors to maximize profits is frequently a
much more plausible explanation. 16 In particular, the Coase theo-
rem does not predict very well when applied to individuals acting as
consumers, rather than producers. This is so for two reasons. First,
to the extent individuals experience declining marginal utility of in-
come, their reservation prices for purchases and sales are not the
same. Second, individuals maximize utility, not wealth; and the util-
ity maximizing outcome is not necessarily the same as the alloca-
tively efficient outcome.
II
AssuMPTIONS, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND TESTABILITY
A. The Weak Version of the Coase Theorem and the
Possibility of Strategic Behavior in the Division of
Surplus Value
When the Coase Theorem's assumptions obtain, any transac-
tion that produces a surplus (i.e., any efficient transaction) will oc-
cur. A surplus exists if the party holding an entitlement places a
lower value on it than a party who does not hold it. The theorem
says nothing explicit about how the surplus will be divided, and the
assumption of profit-maximizing actors suggests that each bargainer
will attempt to have as much of the surplus as possible.
Hoffman and Spitzer, who have conducted several empirical
tests of the Coase theorem, list the following as its preconditions: 17
(a) two agents to each externality (and bargain), (b) perfect knowl-
edge of one another's (convex) production and profit or utility
functions, (c) competitive markets, (d) zero transactions costs; (e)
costless court system, (f) profit-maximizing producers and ex-
16 See infra text accompanying notes 32-69.
17 Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 73.
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pected utility-maximizing consumers, (g) no wealth effects, (h)
agents will strike mutually advantageous bargains in the absence
of transactions costs.
Their (a) is equivalent to my (1), described in Section B, infra. Their
(c), competition, is not necessary,' 8 was not present in most of the
markets that Coase used as examples (most were bilateral monopo-
lies), and is not present in many of the interesting experiments that
Hoffman and Spitzer themselves create. 19 Preconditions (b), (d),
and (e) are all parts of the same assumption, namely, that bargaining
is costless, as Hoffman and Spitzer later note.20 Assumption (g) is
necessary because almost everyone 2' now concedes that if there are
nontrivial wealth effects over the long run there will be more invest-
ment in the side of the market where costs are reduced, and less in
the side of the market where costs are increased. Thus the amount
of an activity will be affected by a change in the liability rule, and the
invariance thesis will not apply. 22
Preconditions (f) and (h) appear to be the same thing, but Hoff-
man and Spitzer argue that both are necessary. Profit or utility
maximizing agents (f), they argue, guarantee only "individual" ra-
tionality, not a mutually advantageous "group" outcome. 23 The
one place that individually rational profit-maximizing behavior may
not yield a socially optimal result is when strategic behavior occurs
as people try to obtain the largest possible share of the surplus. For
example, in the case of the confectioner and the physician discussed
earlier,24 the confectioner will pay the physician some amount be-
tween $90 and $100 for the right to operate his machinery.
Whether the amount is closer to $90 or to $100 is indeterminate
under the Coase theorem, and may depend on the parties' bargain-
ing skills. Good bargaining may involve threats of inefficient behav-
ior. Donald Regan argues that if firm bargaining strategies include
threats to do inefficient things, the threats will be credible only if
people occasionally carry them out. As a result, at least some effi-
cient bargains will fail to be struck, or suboptimal bargains
18 Coase acknowledges this. See supra text accompanying note 5.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 41-49.
20 Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 74.
21 That is, almost everyone except Coase himself, who argues that under perfect
information people would write contracts that took the risk of changes in legal rules into
account. See R. CoAsE, supra note 1, at 171; Schwab, supra note 10, at 1180.
22 See Cooter, supra note 9, at 15 n.13.
23 Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 75 n.8 ("The Coase The-
orem also needs an assumption which provides for combining individually rational be-
havior into a group outcome.").
24 See supra text accompanying note 3.
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created. 25
Scholars who have approached the Coase Theorem as an em-
pirical statement have assumed that strategic behavior of bargainers
will sometimes result in an uneven division of this surplus between
the bargainers. This section argues that the Coase theorem predicts
equal division of the surplus. Strategic behavior successfully giving
one party more than half of the surplus is inconsistent with the
premises of profit-maximization and perfect information. The argu-
ment here applies both to situations involving only a single bargain,
and to situations in which the parties might make multiple bargains
and have information about all of them. As a result, Hoffman and
Spitzer's assumption (h) is unnecessary. Further, Donald Regan's
suggestion that some inefficient transactions will fail to occur be-
cause a strategic bargainer will occasionally carry out a threat to
walk away from a profitable bargain is inconsistent with the theo-
rem's assumptions. This will not happen if the parties have perfect
information and both parties are profit-maximizers. In short, effi-
cient bargains will always occur.
Strategic behavior comes in two general kinds. One kind in-
volves "bluffing," or giving the other side misleading information
about one's own position, as in a poker game. But this kind of stra-
tegic behavior is inconsistent with the assumption of perfect infor-
mation. Another kind of strategic behavior is the threat to behave
irrationally: i.e., to do something that is not profit-maximizing for
the strategizer but that imposes losses on the oppqnent as well, such
as walking away from a profitable bargain. But, once again, the the-
orem assumes both perfect information and profit-maximizing par-
ticipants. If I have perfect information, this includes information
about the assumed fact that my bargaining partner is a profit-maxi-
mizer, just as I am. My opponent's threat to abandon a potentially
profitable bargain will not be credible, and we will divide the sur-
plus. Inefficient strategic behavior seems inconsistent with the strict
premises of perfect information and individual profit maximization.
To the extent information is less than perfect, of course, inefficient
strategic behavior becomes possible.
One situation stated as an exception 26 is that strategic behavior
might become possible when the strategist is involved in many
transactions, and his bargaining partners have information about all
of them. The strategist might always threaten to walk away unless
he receives a larger share of the surplus, and he might occasionally
walk away in order to make his threats credible. This multi-bargain
25 Regan, supra note 8, at 429-30; cf Cooter, supra note 9, at 18; Schwab, supra note
10, at 1175-77.
26 See Cooter, supra note 9, at 17-29; Regan, supra note 8, at 429-30.
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strategy might be profitable for him if the larger shares of the sur-
plus he obtains from the sum of the successful trades outweigh his
losses from the occasional trade where he carries out his threat.
This creates a prisoners' dilemma situation. If all the strategist's op-
ponents held firm in insisting on half of the surplus, the strategy
would not work. But, acting individually, each opponent might find
it individually maximizing to complete the bargain and take less
than half of the surplus, rather than risk not completing the bargain
at all and losing all the surplus.
But even this strategy would not work under perfect informa-
tion. Suppose, for example, that strategist S had five bargaining
partners, A, B, C, D, and E. In each case a successful transaction
would produce a surplus of $4. For example, A-E each own an enti-
tlement that they value at $16 and that S values at $20. S wishes to
purchase these entitlements at less than $18, which would be an
equal division of the surplus, so he threatens each individual bar-
gainer that he will walk away unless the bargainer agrees to accept,
say, $17 for her entitlement. In order to make his threat credible, S
must walk away from at least one bargain. In this case, if he walks
away from one, he will obtain $12 in surplus (4 transactions at $3
surplus each). Under an equal division of the surplus S would ob-
tain only $10 (5 transactions at $2 surplus each).
Under what circumstances will A, B, C, D or E yield to this
threat? If they know that S walks away from one-fifth of his bar-
gains, then the cost of a lost bargain is the ordinarily expected half
of the surplus, or $2, multiplied by the probability that the bargain
will be lost, or .2. The anticipated cost of a lost bargain is thus 40
cents, but the price for avoiding this risk by accepting the strategist's
offer is $1. A profit maximizing, risk-neutral trader will accept the
risk of the 40 cent loss and hold out for a division of the surplus.
When will the trading partner give up the surplus because the
risk of a lost bargain is too high? Only when the risk-adjusted cost
of a lost bargain is equal to or greater than the $1 surplus that he is
asked to give up. But in the above example that would be true only
if S walked away from half his bargains. 27 If he walked away from
that many bargains, the losses on these would far more than offset
the gains made on the others. As a generalized proof in the note
shows, 28 there are no circumstances under which the strategizer can
27 I.e., the loss of the bargain would cost the trader $2, and the strategizer is de-
manding a trade that gives the trader only $1. Since there are five trades, the strategizer
would have to walk away from half of them to create a risk-adjusted cost of $1.
28 Assume that strategizer S engages in a set of n transactions with multiple trading
partners. There could be a different trading partner for each transaction, or one trading
partner could be involved in more than one of these transactions. In each case the sur-
plus is X, and S threatens to walk away from any bargain unless S receives more than .5X
1990]
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profitably threaten to walk away from a bargain, assuming that the
trading partner is risk neutral. Importantly, it is not even necessary
for the trading partner to know the probability that the strategizer
will walk away from a profitable bargain. He need know only that
(1) the strategizer's long-term goal is profit-maximization; 29 and (2)
no possible strategy of walking away from profitable trades can maxi-
mize the strategizer's profits, if each trading partner computes the
risks accurately. As a result, strategic bargaining designed to give
the strategizer a larger share of the surplus is inconsistent with
either of the premises: that both participants have perfect informa-
tion or that both participants are profit maximizers.
Hoffman and Spitzer give other examples of situations where
people might fail to strike efficient bargains. 30 But these are idio-
syncratic, involving such things as people who believe that cows are
sacred, and thus may place noneconomic values on them. In any
event, such facts are inconsistent with the profit-maximization as-
sumption: a business firm that believes cows are sacred and keeps
as its share of the surplus. To make the threat credible, S occasionally, but unpredict-
ably, walks away from a bargain.
This strategy will be profitable to S only if:
(1) (.5X + P)(n - Q) > .5Xn
Where,
P is the amount of surplus in excess of .5X that S asks for;
and
Q is the number of times that S carries out the threat-i.e. walks away from a transac-
tion that would have created surplus X.
But for any trading partner engaged with S in one of these transactions, say A, acceding
to the threat will be profitable only if the amount of surplus A gives up by acceding to
the threat (P) is less than the anticipated cost of the risk that the transaction will not
occur
(2) P < .5X(Q/n)
Solving (1) for Q:
(la) .5Xn + Pn - .5XQ- PQ > .5Xn
(Ib) Pn-.5XQ-PQ > 0
(1c) Pn - PQ > .5XQ
(Id) (Pn - PQ)/.5X > Q
Solving (2) for Q:
(2a) Pn < .5XQ
(2b) Pn/.5X < Q
(2c) Q > Pn/.5X
Combining (1d) and (2c) yields:
(Pn - PQ)/.5X > Pn/.5X
So:
Pn - PQ > Pn
Which means that PQ < 0. Either P or Q must be a negative number. Since Q (the
number of times the threat is carried out) cannot be negative, P must be. In short, the
risk-adjusted cost of a threat not to bargain is greater than the lost surplus only when the
"surplus" the strategist is demanding is a negative number.
29 That is, the strategizer's goal is to maximize the sum of profits made on all
trades, not necessarily to maximize the profits earned on each trade individually.
30 Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 75 n.8.
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large numbers of them even though it is costly to do so is simply not
maximizing its profits.
B. The Strong Version of the Coase Theorem
The strong, or logically necessary version of the Coase theorem
can be described in this way:
Assumptions:
(1) Two traders, A and B, are in a position to bargain freely for ownership
of an alienable reciprocal entitlement, P.
A and B may be either individuals, firms, or groups of simi-
larly situated individuals or firms, such as the large group of land
owners surrounding the polluting refinery. Which they are does
not change the analysis. Of course, larger groups can generate
larger contracting costs. As the number of persons or firms in-
creases, transaction costs generally increase as well.
An "alienable reciprocal entitlement" is a transferable rela-
tionship expressed in the common law dichotomies of "liabil-
ity/no-liability" or "right/duty," that exhausts all possibilities
with respect to its domain. For example, Rancher A's right that
one of his cows may graze on Farmer B's land is a reciprocal enti-
tlement. Assigning the entitlement to A means that the cow may
graze free from liability to B for damages; assigning it to B means
that the cow may not graze free from liability. To say that the
reciprocal entitlement is alienable means merely that if A has the
entitlement, B may purchase it from him, or vice-versa.
(2) Both A and B are profit maximizers.
This means that for any alienable reciprocal entitlement P,
currently held by B, A will purchase P at price X if P's profitability
to A is greater than X. A will not purchase P at price X if P's prof-
itability to A is less than X. Likewise, for any entitlement P cur-
rently held by A, A will sell P to B at price Y if the profitability of P
to A is less than Y. A will not sell P to B at price Y if the profitabil-
ity of P to A is greater than Y. These assumptions are reciprocal,
in that they must apply equally to decisions made by B.
(3) Transaction (bargaining) costs are C, and must be borne by the parties
to any bargain.
"Transaction costs" here refer to all costs, including costs re-
sulting from less-than-perfect information. An assumption of
zero transaction costs implies that information is perfect.
(4) A forced transfer of an alienable reciprocal entitlement has no wealth
effects; or if it has wealth effects these are fully accounted for by the parties in
the bargaining process.
The Coase Theorem says that:
(1) IfC = 0, A values P at X, B values P at Y, andX > Y,A
will retain P if he already has it or will purchase it from B if B
currently has it.
(2) If C = 0, A values P at X, B values P at Y, and X < Y, A
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will sell P to B if A currently has it; but A will not purchase P from
B if B currently has it.
More generally:
(3) IfC = N, A values P at X, B values P at Y, andX > Ybut
(X - Y) < N; then A will retain P if he already has it, but will not
purchase it from B if B currently has it.
(4) If C = N, A values P at X, B values P at Y, X > Y and (X
- Y) > N, then A will retain P if he already has it or purchase it
from B if B currently has it.
The four conclusions of the Coase Theorem stated above fol-
low deductively from the four given assumptions. Any empirical ob-
servation that a reciprocal entitlement is not in the hands of the
person who values it most highly can only be explained by one of
these possibilities: (1) the parties are not able to bargain freely
about the entitlement; (2) the parties are not profit-maximizers; (3)
bargaining costs, including the costs of imperfect information, ex-
ceed the difference in value of the entitlement to the two parties.
Whether the firms are objectively free to bargain should ordina-
rily be a matter of simple empirical observation. Of course, firms or
other organizations might not be "free" to bargain because of hid-
den internal disputes about authority or policy. But the existence of
such inefficiencies inside the firm would go to the question of profit
maximization rather than objective ability to bargain. As to bargain-
ing costs, these costs may be difficult to measure-particularly in the
bilateral monopoly situation to which the Coase theorem was histor-
ically applied.3t
C. Why Does the Coase Theorem Fail to Predict?
One important conclusion that follows from the observation
that the Coase theorem is analytic is that one cannot conduct "em-
pirical tests" of the theorem itself, but only of the degree to which
one or more of its assumptions might fail to obtain in a given situa-
tion. Conducting empirical tests of the Coase theorem is like con-
ducting empirical tests of the Pythagorean theorem. Given the
theorem's assumptions, the results flow out as a matter of logical
necessity.32
Studies of markets in which the Coase theorem appears not to
work very well have generally attributed the result to high, but inde-
terminate, transaction costs. 3 3 The general notion of a "market fail-
31 See, e.g., 2 PAUL SAMUELSON, THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAM-
UELSON 1411 (1966) (on difficulties of bargaining in the bilateral monopoly situations
illustrated by The Problem of Social Cost.). For a contrary view, see Richard D. Friedman,
Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 873.
32 See supra text accompanying note 13.
33 E.g., Ellickson, supra note 12, at 628, 686.
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ure" is that in certain markets private bargaining will not yield the
optimal result because transaction costs, in some sense, are too
high. For example, Vogel concludes that "in a zero transaction cost
world the Coase theorem would be verified, as it is tautologically,
true. Any failure of the theorem would always be due to the exist-
ence of transaction costs." 3 4
Most of those discussing the perceived failure of the Coase the-
orem to predict in a particular market have not attributed the result
to one or both bargainers' failure to maximize profits. There are at
least two reasons for this. First, the question of firm profit-max-
imization is generally considered to be firm-specific, rather than
market specific. That is, assuming there are firms that do not maxi-
mize profits, they are probably scattered through all markets; thus, if
the theorem works in market A but not in market B, we want an
explanation that distinguishes these two markets as markets. How-
ever, as a later section argues,3 5 sometimes failure of profit-max-
imization may be inherent in the market. This is likely to occur
when at least one participant is a utility-maximizing consumer rather
than a profit-maximizing business firm.
A second reason that failure to maximize profits is not offered
to explain apparent failures of the Coase theorem is that, while
transaction costs at least in principle are empirically measurable,
profit-maximization is not. In fact, the general proposition that
firms maximize profits is probably not capable of being verified, for
any test would produce too many counterexamples.3 6 The evidence
is equally consistent with alternative theories, such as maximization
of output3 7 or revenue,38 "satisficing," or some other measure that
maximizes the utility of the managers rather than the profits of the
shareholders.3 9 For example, the widespread use by managers of
34 Vogel, supra note 12, at 186.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 50-62.
36 See Lawrence A. Boland, On the Futility of Criticizing the Neoclassical Maximization
Hypothesis, 71 Ai. ECON. REV. 1031 (1981); BruceJ. Caldwell, The Neoclassical Maximiza-
tion H)pothesis: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 824 (1983).
37 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR 85-126
(1968); John Williamson, Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization, 34 ECONOMICA 1 (1966);
Robert E. Wong, Profit Maximization and Alternative Theories: A Dynamic Reconciliation, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 689 (1975).
38 E.g., WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH ch. 6 (1967);
Leland, The Dynamics of a Revenue Maximizing Firm, 13 INT'L ECON. REV. 376 (1972).
39 E.g., ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932) (inefficient managerial incentives result from separation of own-
ership and control); W. BAUMOL, supra note 38 (sales maximization); ROBIN MARRIS, THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM (1964) (maximization of growth rate);
HERBERT A. SIMON, RATIONAL DECISION MAKING IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1978)
(bounded rationality and satisficing, or the seeking of performance that satisfies mini-
mum expectations in a variety of areas); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1967)
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"pbison pills" or other devices to thwart takeover attempts suggests
that firms' managers often behave in ways that are not calculated to
maximize the profits of their firm. The efficient market hypothesis
suggests that firms are taken over when they are performing inef-
ficiently, and that takeovers tend to assign firms to more efficient
managers. A manager who was seeking to maximize stockholder
profits would be inclined to permit the firm to be taken over if it
performed inefficiently. 40 If firms do not behave in such a way as to
maximize profits in a given situation, the Coase theorem cannot be
shown to apply. That is, firms may sometimes walk away from effi-
cient bargains, such as acquisitions that increase the wealth of the
firm, although at the expense of managers, who might lose their
jobs.
Hoffman's and Spitzer's empirical tests4' probably came as
close to any in creating a situation where transaction costs are zero.
Each person had complete information about the other's objective
position. The bargains were simple and one-dimensional. The
rules were simple and were apparently understood by the parties. It
is difficult to imagine a real world market with lower transaction
costs.
But the experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer, as well as of
others who have followed them,42 have not been well calculated to
test the profit-maximization or utility-maximization hypothesis. The
experiments themselves implicitly identified the object of the market
game at issue as profit-maximization. Those administering the ex-
periments instructed participants that "If you follow the instructions
carefully you might earn a considerable amount of money." 43 But
the fact that a person pinches pennies to win says nothing about
whether he, on the whole, is a profit-maximizer. Presumably, most
people prefer more money to less if nothing else is to be traded
away. The experimental tests of the Coase theorem effectively cre-
ated a situation in which there was little or nothing to be traded
away and found that, under such circumstances, people played a
money game to win. An important problem of such tests is that
(institutional constraints on efficient behavior); Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency
vs. "X-Efficiency", 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966) (failure of internal accountability
schemes to minimize costs). Other literature is discussed in F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 33-38 (1987).
40 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984); Robert Smiley, Tender Offers, Transaction Costs, and
the Theory of the Firm, 58 REV. ECON & STATISTICS 22 (1976).
41 See Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, supra note 12, at 259; Hoffman & Spitzer, The
Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 73.
42 E.g., Harrison & McKee, supra note 12, at 653.
43 Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 83; Harrison & McKee,
supra note 12, at 666.
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profit-maximization is either specified ex ante, or else there are no
competing considerations that compromise each participant's desire
to maximize profits. If profit-maximization is specified or assumed,
and the profit-maximization hypothesis is the only interesting em-
pirical hypothesis to be tested, then the test has assumed the
conclusion.
III
THE COASE THEOREM IN THE ABSENCE OF PROFIT-
MAXIMIZATION: THE PROBLEM OF CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that business firms seek
to maximize profits. Although the assumption that firms invariably
seek to maximize profits is not empirically provable, and probably is
false,44 a less robust version of the statement might be true-such as
firms try to maximize profits generally, or more often than not. The
empirical weakness in the firm profit-maximization hypothesis has
not bothered most neoclassical economists very much. First of all,
the assumption is so critical to model building that neoclassical eco-
nomics could not survive in its present form without it. Second,
models based on competition prefer that firms maximize profits.
This preference gives the profit-maximization premise a character
that is more normative than positive.
But individuals acting as consumers do not seek to maximize
profits. They seek to maximize utility. This fact can undermine ap-
plication of the Coase theorem for two different reasons: (1) most
people experience decreasing, not constant, marginal utility of in-
come; (2) wealth is only one ingredient in the utility functions of
most people.
This divergence between individual utility functions and indi-
vidual wealth functions accounts for many of the inconsistent results
in empirical tests of the Coase theorem-particularly those that call
the invariance thesis into question. All of Coase's examples in The
Problem of Social Cost involved profit-maximizing business firms.
Many of the empirical tests have involved utility maximizing con-
sumers-or, in some cases, such as the work of Ellickson 45 and Vo-
gel,46 people who were acting simultaneously in their capacity as
profit-maximizing producers and utility-maximizing consumers. 47
In their original experiments on the Coase theorem, Hoffman
and Spitzer defined one of the conditions of the Coase theorem as
44 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
45 Ellickson, supra note 12.
46 Vogel, supra note 12.
47 See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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"profit-maximizing producers and expected utility-maximizing con-
sumers,"'48 thus suggesting that they were going to take both profit-
maximization and utility maximization into account. However, the
experiments were set up so that maximization of a cash payout was
identified as the maximiziflg, or efficient, solution. That is, utility
maximization was either not accounted for at all, or utility max-
imization and profit maximization were assumed to be identical.
The tests were contrived in such a way that the marginal utility of
income ("payoff," in the experiment) was constant, and the object
of the experiment was to maximize the payoff. In short, the experi-
ments duplicated, as closely as possible, the situation of two profit-
maximizing firms bargaining around a legal entitlement. In the ex-
periment two or more bargainers were given numbers, 49 to each of
which was assigned a "payoff." However, the payoff of any number
was different for each bargainer. One bargainer, the controller, was
equivalent to the person with the legal entitlement. The controller
was permitted to select a number and the other participant to make
side payments to the controller to influence his choice. The tests
found that in a great majority of cases the parties selected the payoff
that produced the maximum dollar return to the two parties. This
maximum dollar return was identified as the efficient result.
A. The Coase Theorem Under Declining Marginal Utility of
Income
Most people probably experience declining marginal utility of
income-each dollar added to their wealth gives them a marginally
lower level of individual satisfaction than a previous dollar.50 This
proposition is difficult to test, but there is certainly evidence that
supports it. For example, most people purchase loss insurance on
moderately valuable things like their automobiles even though the
expected value of any loss is substantially less than the insurance
premium-i.e., the cost of insurance is at least the cost of the ex-
pected risk plus the transaction costs of creating and marketing the
insurance. People purchase insurance because the marginal utility
per dollar of, say, $100 taken out of their income as insurance pre-
miums, is far less than the marginal utility per dollar of, say, $10,000
48 Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 12, at 73.
49 On experiments with two and three bargainers, see Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase
Theorem, supra note 12. On experiments with larger numbers of bargainers, see Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining
Groups, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986). The first to observe that the Coase theorem could
apply equally to large groups of bargainers was Calabresi, supra note 14, at 68.
50 See GORDON TULLOCK, ECONOMICS OF INCOME REDISTRIBU-ION 21 (1983) ("al-
most everyone has agreed that above a very low point monetary income is subject to
declining margin of returns.").
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taken out of their income if they should have to replace a destroyed
vehicle. The $100 comes out of their income at the margin, and
competes with savings account, nights at the movies or additional
toys for the children. But the $10,000 loss, should it occur, would
threaten mortgage or rental payments, food, clothing or other
things that they consider to be more important.
Several people have observed an apparent anomaly in the
Coase theorem that shows up in consumer evaluations of products
or services: people seem to measure value very differently depend-
ing on whether they are "buying in" or "selling out." For example,
in some experiments people were asked to assume that a factory
belched smoke that obstructed a beautiful view from their home.
They were then asked two questions: (1) assuming that the factory
had the right to produce the smoke, how much would you pay the
factory not to do it? and (2) assuming that the factory did not have
the right to produce the smoke, how much would the factory have to
pay you for the right to produce it?5' The answers showed consist-
ently that the amount in (2) was substantially higher than the
amount in (1). To the extent this is true the "invariance" corollary
of the Coase theorem-i.e., that the initial assignment of a right does
not effect the outcome-may not apply when one of the bargainers
is a consumer.
More recent tests in both hypothetical 52 and real markets have
tended to confirm and even strengthen this result. In a recent em-
pirical study two sets of subjects were presented a harmless but ex-
tremely foul tasting fluid, which they were to place in their mouths
for 20 seconds.53 One group was told that the fluid would be placed
in their mouths unless they bid successfully for an entitlement not to
be subjected to the fluid. A second group was told that they would
51 In the literature of welfare economics, this is generally defined as the problem of
compensating and equivalent variations. A compensating variation is the amount of
money a person is willing to pay for a change that he desires. An equivalent variation is
the amount of money a person would accept as compensation for a change that he does
not desire. See John R. Hicks, The Four Consumer's Surpluses, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 31
(1943). Welfare economists have traditionally assumed that with respect to any particu-
lar entitlement the compensating and equivalent variations would be very close to one
another. E.g., JOHN R. HICxs, A REvISION OF DEMAND THEORY 65 (1956); Robert D.
Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 589 (1976).
52 For the many problems that attend use of experimental markets, see Charles R.
Plott, Rational Choice in Experimental Markets, 59 J. Bus. S301 (1986). For example, psy-
chologists, who often produce results quite inconsistent with the Coase theorem, tend to
use rich descriptions designed to simulate real world behavior. The experiments by
economists tend to be extremely stripped down.
53 Don L. Coursey, John L. Hovis, & William D. Schulze, The Disparity Between Will-
ingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value, 102 QJ. ECON. 679 (1987); see also
Coursey, Hoffman & Spitzer, Fear and Loathing in the Coase Theorem: Experimental Tests In-
volving Physical Discomfort, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1987).
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receive a certain amount of money for being subjected to the fluid,
provided that they were the low bidder. The bidding showed con-
sistently that willingness to pay was much lower than willingness to
accept. In some tests willingness to pay to avoid the fluid averaged
under $3.00, while willingness to accept the fluid required average
payments higher than $10.00. A dozen other experiments by both
economists and psychologists have produced the same results.54
The experiments generally conclude that when the valuation pro-
cess is applied to goods or services that are not ordinarily traded on
markets (e.g., clean air, unwaivable landlord's habitability warran-
ties) the disparities between willingness to accept and willingness to
pay are much larger than they are for market goods.5 5 In some
cases involving environmental entitlements, differences between
willingness to pay and willingness to accept ranged from factors of 4
to 16.56
The studies also suggest that people tend to regard their cur-
rent or anticipated income as an important reference point for de-
termining the utility of income. That is, for one who has become
accustomed to a given standard of living, the utility cost of a sudden
substantial reduction in income is much greater than the utility gain
of a sudden increase in income of the same magnitude.57
Mark Kelman has argued that observations such as these under-
mine the Coase Theorem.58 I do not believe that is true. The tests
54 E.g. R.G. CUMMINGS, D.S. BROOKSHIRE & W.D. SCHULZE, VALUING ENVIRONMEN-
TAL GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1986); David M.
Grether & Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon,
69 AM. ECON. REV. 623 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A.
Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded as Experimental Evidence of an Unex-
pected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 QJ. ECON. 507 (1984).
55 E.g., Coursey, Hovis & Schulze, supra note 53, at 680.
56 E.g., JUDD HAMMACK & GARDNER M. BROWN, WATERFOWL & WETLANDS: TOWARD
BIOECONOMic ANALYSIS (1974) (hunters would pay $247 on average to preserve a wet-
land hunting area, but would require $1044 to release an entitlement to it that they
already had); Philip A. Meyer, Publicly Vested Values for Fish and Wildlife: Criteria in Economic
Welfare and Interface with the Law, 55 LAND ECON. 223 (1979) (same); Rowe & Brookshire,
An Experiment in the Economic Value of Visibility, 8 J. ENV. ECON. & MANAGEMENT 1 (1980)
(on air quality, difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept was as
much as factor of 16); William D. Schulze, Ralph C. d'Arge & David S. Brookshire, Valu-
ing Environmental Commodities: Some Recent Experiments, 57 LAND ECON. 151 (1981) (same).
For earlier experiments along the same lines, see David Bramhall & Edwin S. Mills, A
Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments, 2 WATER RESOURCES RES. 615 (1966); M.I.
Kamien, N.L. Schwartz & F.T. Dolbear, Asymmetry Between Bribes and Charges, 2 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 147 (1966); Richard A. Tybout, Pricing Pollution and Other Negative Exter-
nalities, 3 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 252 (1972).
57 Coursey, Hovis & Schulze, supra note 53, at 679; Kahneman & Tversky, supra
note 54; see also Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Non-Reversible Indiffer-
ence Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277 (1989).
58 Kelman, supra note 11, at 678-95.
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merely illustrate that people acting as consumers bargain their util-
ity, not their dollar profits. For most people, the marginal utility of
dollars declines. As a result, from any given starting point, people
tend to regard a payment of, say, $1000 out of their income as
"costing" more, in utility terms, than the gain they obtain from a
contribution of $1000 to their income. Furthermore, it appears that
the utility curve for income has a discontinuous change in slope, or
a "kink," at people's current level of income. That is, people with a
weekly income of, say, $800, tend to regard that $800 as extremely
important to their well-being, and losing $100 of it would be very
serious. Getting an additional $100 above the $800 might be nice,
but it would not increase satisfaction nearly as much as the loss of
$100 would decrease satisfaction.
The invariance thesis of the Coase theorem assumes that the
marginal utility of income is constant. The proposition that the
same allocative result obtains regardless of how legal entitlements
are initially assigned assumes that the person who is willing to sell
an entitlement for $60 or more is also willing to purchase it for $60
or less-i.e., its value at the margin is $60, and the marginal value is
all that counts. For the business firm engaged in business relation-
ships this may be so,59 disregarding wealth effects, but not neces-
sarily for the individual consumer. This fact has proved quite
troublesome for neoclassical welfare economists, who have gener-
ally assumed that willingness to pay and willingness to accept are
about the same thing.60
The person who must purchase an entitlement buys it with in-
come that he already has, while the person who sells an entitlement
receives an increment above his current income. People generally
maximize their utility, not their wealth. If the marginal utility of in-
come declines, a person willing to pay N dollars for an entitlement
that he does not have would require more than N dollars as the
price for selling an entitlement that he already has-i.e., since the
incremental dollars give him less utility than the dollars he already
has, he will require more dollars to yield the same utility.6'
59 Although not necessarily. A growth conscious manager might regard an annual
report showing a 10 cent per share decline in profits as far more harmful than a report
showing a 10 cent increase as beneficial. But this would be an indicator that the man-
ager was maximizing output, not profits.
60 E.g., Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 54, at 507 ("The usual presumption is that,
aside from small differences due to income or wealth effects, estimates of value will be
invariant between the two measures.").
61 Figure One illustrates. The vertical axis measures consumer utility, expressed in
utils. The horizontal axis measures wealth, in dollars. Function C shows constant mar-
ginal utility of income drawn at three utils per dollar: each additional unit of income
produces three additional units of utility. Function D shows declining utility of income,
with a kink at point X.
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For example, suppose that a person receives ten fewer utils, or
units of utility, from each $1000 added to her income, and that at
her current income level the marginal utility generated by $1000 in
income is 100 utils. An increment of $1000 from this point will give
her 90 utils, an increment of $2000 from this point will give her 170
utils (90 + 80), etc. On the other hand, $1000 taken away from her
income will reduce her utility by 100 units, and $2000 taken away
will reduce it by 210 units (100 + 110).
Now consider a nuisance case, since the Coase theorem was
designed around nuisance and trespass cases in bilateral bargaining
situations. This particular nuisance case involves a purely aesthetic
dispute between two home owners. One home owner wishes to put
up a fence that a neighboring homeowner finds quite ugly, and that
will reduce her happiness by 100 utils. Using the numbers above, if
the offended neighbor must purchase a promise not to build the
fence, she will be willing to pay $1000 out of her existing wealth.
But if she owned the right to enjoin construction of the fence, she
would demand approximately $1111 as a payment, for the incre-
mental dollars bring her less utility per dollar than do the dollars
she already has. Since cardinal utilities cannot be quantified and
compared interpersonally, different people cannot be shown to have
the same utility curves. As a result, we cannot know whether the two
Consumer
C
Utility
B D
B' x
X A
X'A
At Wealth
FIGURE ONE
Measurement of compensating and equivalent variations from point X', which is on the
constant utility function, shows that the two are equal. Such a person would be willing
to pay $1 (A') for an entitlement that provided 3 units of utility; or, if she already had the
entitlement, she would accept $1 (B') as compensation for giving it up. But if the person
had utility curve D, the numbers would be quite different. Someone who did not have
an entitlement creating three units of utility would be willing to pay approximately $2
(A) to have it. But that same person asked to give it up would demand approximately $5
(B) as compensation.
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neighbors' utility curves are identical. In that case the Coase theo-
rem cannot tell us that the initial assignment of the entitlement has
no impact on whether the fence will be built. For example, if the
offending neighbor experiences constant marginal utility of dollars
and the fence gives him utility equivalent to $1075, he will not build
the fence if the entitlement is given to the offended neighbor, but he
will build it if it is given to him.
Importantly, the failure of the Coase theorem in the above ex-
ample is not the result of transaction costs, or any other imperfection
in the market. The market could be functioning perfectly, yet the
Coase theorem fails to show that the initial assignment of legal
rights has no bearing on the outcome.
Situations such as the one in the example will occur when both
parties to a bargain are acting as consumers, or when one of the
parties is a consumer and the other a producer. Consider, for exam-
ple, the question of the nonwaivable implied warranty of habitability
in residential leases in a noncompetitive housing market-one
where housing is in short supply in relation to its demand, as it is in
many American cities. The Coase theorem suggests that giving
landlords as opposed to tenants the duty to maintain housing will
have no impact on the quality of the housing-for example, if the
furnace does not work it is immaterial whether the landlord or the
tenant is given the obligation to fix it. If fixing it costs $40 and heat-
ing is worth only $30 to the tenant, the furnace will not be fixed. If
the tenant must pay to fix it, she will not pay. If the landlord must
pay to fix it, he will simply reduce the rent by, say, $35 in exchange
for a waiver from the tenant, and both landlord and tenant will be
better off. Because the parties will bargain their way to an efficient
solution, an inalienable (i.e., unwaivable) entitlement on the tenant's
part to have the furnace repaired by the landlord will be inefficient.
It means that the landlord will simply be required to raise the rents
by $40, even though that is not in the best interest of the tenant.
But if the tenant obtains more satisfaction per dollar from the
wealth he already has than from any wealth he may additionally ac-
quire, this will not necessarily be the case. Particularly if the tenant
is spending close to his income level on things he regards as necessi-
ties, the price he would pay for heat that he did not have will be less
than the price he would demand for an entitlement to heat that he
already has. This suggests that in a market in which landlords are
earning an economic surplus, a nonwaivable implied warranty of
habitability would (1) increase the quality of housing and (2) the
costs would not be passed on entirely to tenants.
The fact that consumers place different values on goods or serv-
ices depending on whether they are "buying in" or "selling out" is a
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natural consequence of the declining marginal utility of income.
But this creates a problem for the welfare economist, since marginal
utility curves cannot be measured by the external observer. For ex-
ample, Alice might be unwilling to purchase adequate medical care
for her sick child because she does not have the $1000 a month that
it costs. But nevertheless Alice would not sell an entitlement to such
care, if she-already had it, for $2000. The entitlement may not be
something for which we can observe transactions, if there is no mar-
ket for such entitlements. They are created by legislation and are
not transferable-for example, my 70 year-old father cannot sell me
or anyone else his Medicare privileges.
Which of the above two numbers should we use in identifying
the efficient solution to the problem of expensive health care, $1000
or $2000? The neoclassical preference for markets says that Alice
"values" the offered medical care at less than $1000, for she is un-
willing to purchase it at that price. In an efficient market she would
not have the care if the care costs $1000. But if we give her the
entitlement to begin with, then it is clear that she "values" the care
by far more. She would not sell her entitlement for $2000.
Suppose the welfare economist wants to know whether Alice's
entitlement to health care is efficient? Is Alice's "welfare" less than
$1000, or is it greater than $2000? Clearly, if the welfare economist has
reliable information about both numbers, he must take the larger one into ac-
count in calculating welfare. For example, if Alice currently had the
entitlement and it were transferable, we would accept her refusal to
sell it for $2000 as evidence that the entitlement gave her at least
$2000 in welfare. An equilibrium in which Alice had the entitlement
would contain more welfare than one in which it was held by some-
one who was willing to sell it for, say, $1100, but not less. The
problem, of course, is the premise in the italicized statement. By
simply looking at real world markets we can verify that Alice will not
purchase medical care when it is priced at $1000. We have no easy
means of identifying the price at which Alice would sell such care, if
she were already entitled to it. In this case the economic positivist's
methodological insistence on propositions that can be tested creates
a strong bias, not merely in favor of markets, but also in favor of the
status quo assignment of entitlements. 62
B. The Coase Theorem and Utility (Rather than Profit)
Maximization
Although business firms presumably maximize wealth, consum-
62 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,
33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
804 [Vol. 75:783
COASE THEOREM
ing individuals maximize utility. Wealth is probably an important
ingredient in the utility of most people, but it is probably not the
only ingredient. Further, utility, unlike wealth, is not cardinally
comparable from one person to another. When people are acting as
consumers, rather than producers, they may prefer things that do
not maximize their wealth. Since wealth can be measured objec-
tively, while utility cannot be, some transactions involving consum-
ers can be expected to produce results that are not efficient when
objectively measured.
This argument has two sides: (1) the utility maximizing result
may not maximize wealth, objectively measured; or, (2) some market
encounters may produce the result that maximizes wealth, objec-
tively measured, but this result will not maximize utility.
As an example of the first, assume that Lewd and Prude63 are
neighbors on unzoned property. Lewd proposes to tear down his
house and build an adult bookstore. The bookstore will make
Lewd's property $100 more valuable and Prude's property, still
used as a residence, $80 less valuable. Suppose that the law entitles
Prude to enjoin the construction of the bookstore as a private nui-
sance. The Coase theorem says that Lewd will pay Prude a sum be-
tween $80 and $100 and build the bookstore anyway. But in this
case Prude's utility function includes more than wealth. Prude is
willing to "pay" something to live in a house free of a neighboring
use that he regards as offensive. In fact, it would not be unheard of
in such situations for people such as Prude to file suit to enjoin the
bookstore even though construction of the bookstore made both
Lewd's and Prude's property objectively more valuable. Such a con-
clusion does not suggest that Prude is irrational. It suggests simply
that Prude as a consumer-a homeowner-wants an environment
that maximizes his utility; and his utility is not exactly the same thing
as his wealth. Once again, the failure of the Coase theorem to pre-
dict the outcome has nothing to do with the presence of high trans-
action costs; they are not the issue.
In this case it would be wrong to say that the Coase theorem
does not "work"-it works fine, provided that we modify its mean-
ing to refer to Prude's utility rather than his wealth. Unfortunately,
however, this qualification undermines the predictive power of the
theorem, for utility functions cannot be measured. One considering
the utility of consumers, rather than the wealth of producers, can no
longer look at the dollar amounts of transaction costs, or the rele-
vant profits and losses of the participants to a bargain (as measured
by objective market value) in order to determine which legal rule
63 Apologies to Amartya Sen, who used Lewd and Prude for a different purpose.
See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970).
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will be more efficient. Nor can one verify or falsify the Coase theo-
rem by "observing" that people do the "efficient" thing. We cannot
define the efficient thing in terms of objective criteria, such as profit-
maximization. The fact that Prude refuses to sell Lewd the right to
build his adult bookstore is the only evidence that we have of
Prude's utility. Experimental tests such as those of Hoffman and
Spitzer finesse this result by defining utility maximization ex ante as
the "payoff" from a game with a stranger. It is quite conceivable
that a person placed in a room with someone else and instructed in
a negotiating game will attempt to maximize the payoff, but that the
same person living out other aspects of her life will find plenty of
things that compete with wealth in her hierarchy of values.
Ellickson's study of dispute resolution among ranchers in
Shasta County, California,64 is a good example of the producer-ori-
ented Coase theorem coming up against the utility-maximizing con-
sumer. Shasta County's ranchers are business persons, but they also
are neighbors. They live on their ranches. Their businesses and
their living community are very much the same thing. Ellickson
found that the ranchers in Shasta County paid little attention to the
basic legal regime or to changes in rules governing fencing obliga-
tions in determining who should be held accountable for trespassing
cattle, or what the nature of the accounting should be. Ellickson
suggests that the failure of the Coase theorem to account for the
outcomes he observed is a result of high transaction costs. 65 But
transaction costs appeared to be no higher in Shasta County than in
many other inter-business settings. In fact, the participants may
have had a standard of honesty that made strategic maneuvering
less likely in Shasta County than in many business situations arising
in more urban areas. Furthermore, the parties generally eschewed
such expensive transacting devices as lawyers and courts. As Ellick-
son notes elsewhere, the same ranchers were not reluctant to sue
outsiders over such things as traffic accidents or water rights. 66
The real reason the Shasta County ranchers did not engage in
strict bargaining in the shadow of the legal system is that the ranch-
ers were neighbors as much as they were business persons. As a
result, profits and "neighborliness" had to be traded against each
other. The rancher who immediately filed a damage action when a
neighbor's cow trespassed might enlarge his profits, but he would
not improve the quality of his life in the community. The Shasta
county rancher is both business firm and consumer. Thus the busi-
64 Ellickson, supra note 12.
65 Id. at 628, 686.
66 Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control,
16J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 67-68 (1987).
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ness firm's desire to maximize profits was constantly compromised
by the consumer's desire to maximize utility. Utility, in this case,
was a complex quality in which wealth was only one element.
Under the classical Berle and Means critique, 67 the modem cor-
poration is inefficient because ownership is separated from control.
However, there also are reasons for thinking that firms are ineffi-
dent precisely because ownership is not separated from control.
This occurs when people deal with one another in their same capac-
ity as producers and consumers. Farmers are a good example. As
firms, they seek to maximize profits. But as individuals who are both
neighbors and dwellers, they seek to maximize the total quality of
their living situation, of which wealth is only one important element.
For example, my neighbor's extremely smelly hog operation may
have no negative impact on my farm's financial operations. But I live
on my farm too, and as a result it may affect the quality of my life as
a consumer. Before the Coase theorem will make reliable predic-
tions in such situations it must disaggregate firm (profit-maximiz-
ing) behavior from consumer (utility maximizing) behavior.
A second problem is that the results that the Coase theorem
identifies as efficient, because they maximize wealth, do not neces-
sarily maximize utility. This is so because different people place dif-
ferent utility values on dollars, but the Coase theorem considers
only transfers of dollars qua dollars in its assessment of welfare.
To take another nuisance example, suppose that you and I
share an inland lake. I like to fish for pleasure from my rowboat and
you like to run your speedboat. Your boating makes my fishing im-
possible, but it is not tortious and no ordinance prevents your use of
a speedboat on this particular lake. Suppose further that I derive 8
utils, or units of utility, from fishing and that you derive 6 utils from
boating. However, you are relatively wealthy and as a result have a
relatively low marginal utility for dollars. A dollar gives you 2 utils
of utility. I am relatively poorer, and a dollar gives me 4 utils of
utility. Utils are not exchangeable currency; so if we should bargain
about continued operation of your speedboat, I will offer you dol-
lars. In this case you are earning utility, not profit, from operating
your speedboat, and you would insist on at least $3 as compensation
for putting it in dry dock for the season. I also am earning utility,
not profit, from fishing; and I would be willing to pay you only $2,
for that would cost me 8 utils of utility, the same as I obtain from
fishing. In this case you will continue to operate your noisy boat
even though continued operation results in only 6, rather than 8
utils of enjoyment between us.
67 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 39.
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The parties will fail to bargain their way to a utility maximizing
solution because they are acting in their capacity as utility-maximiz-
ing consumers rather than profit (dollar) maximizing producers.
But an external observer could not examine the transaction de-
scribed above and say anything about the utility result, since utilities
cannot be cardinalized and compared from one person to another-
i.e., there is no such thing as a "util" that represents the same
amount of utility to different people. The external observer can see
only the dollar effects of the transfer-he can observe, for example,
that I offered you $2 to stop running your speedboat, that you re-
fused, and that I failed to make a higher offer. If the legal liability
rule were reversed and I could enjoin your operation of the speed-
boat, you would pay me $2.50 or so for the right to continue. Utility
would be maximized only in the second case.
But in both cases the external observer would conclude that we
have reached the efficient solution-continued operation of the
speedboat. The observer would see the Coase theorem functioning
perfectly because she equates the wealth maximizing solution with
the utility maximizing solution. There is no basis for such a conclu-
sion. A more realistic conclusion is that when people are acting in
their capacity as utility-maximizing consumers the Coase theorem
says nothing about the welfare consequences of private bargaining.
IV
CONCLUSION: WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND WELFARE
UNDER THE COASE THEOREM
The preceding discussion suggests four corollaries to the Coase
theorem for the legal policy maker concerned about distributive
justice.
(1) If information is perfect and there are no transaction costs, the state's
initial assignment of wealth or entitlement to the parties cannot be
shown to affect the efficiency of the outcome.
(2) The more efficient the market, the less socially costly it is for the state to
assign initial entitlements on the basis of criteria unrelated to efficiency.
(3) If consumers' utility curves are not the same as their wealth curves,
then the Coase theorem fails to prove that private bargaining will yield
the utility maximizing outcome, insofar as consumers are concerned.
(4) Even in the absence of transaction costs, the amount of social utility
can be affected by the initial assignment of an entitlement.
Critics have often complained that the Coase theorem is noth-
ing more than a normative bias against state interference in the mar-
ket, disguised as a "theorem." The traditional, antistatist corollary
about entitlements is that they should be assigned to the person
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who values them most highly, because that is the way they would be
assigned in an efficient market.
A few people have noted, however, that the Coase theorem can
be turned into a defense of certain kinds of wealth redistribution. In-
deed, Corollary One above, which is nothing more than a restate-
ment of the theorem, asserts that if markets are efficient, people will
bargain their way to an efficient solution regardless of the initial as-
signment of entitlements.
Corollary One suggests Corollary Two: if markets are working
well, entitlements may be assigned on the basis of fairness or justice,
or some similar criteria unrelated to economic efficiency. The allo-
catively efficient solution will emerge nonetheless.68 Perhaps more
importantly, there may be alternative mechanisms for estimating in-
dividual utility functions-for example, psychological tests sug-
gesting that the poor obtain more utility from a dollar than do the
wealthy. If that is so, then the State should not be reluctant to trans-
fer wealth from the rich to the poor in efficiently-working markets.
Wealth, measured economically, will be unaffected (ignoring incen-
tive effects), but utility, measured psychologically, might increase. 69
Likewise, entitlements should be assigned to the person in
whom they create the greatest utility, for that is the way they would
be assigned in a market in which units of utility could be measured
and exchanged. To the extent that interpersonal comparisons of
cardinal utilities are impossible, Corollaries Three and Four cannot
be stated in such a fashion as to show a specific relationship between
the amount of total utility and the initial assignment of a legal right.
But Corollary Three is true whether or not one can make interper-
sonal comparisons of utilities. Further, Corollary Four is verifiable
intrapersonally, as is shown in the willingness to pay/willingness to accept
experiments described earlier.70 When consumers, rather than pro-
ducers, are submitted to transactional situations they maximize their
utility rather than their wealth. Given that individuals have declin-
ing marginal utility of income, they demand more money as com-
pensation for selling an entitlement they already have than they are
willing to pay to purchase the same entitlement if they do not have
it. As a result, the amount of social utility can be affected by the
initial assignment of an entitlement.
The notion of declining marginal utility suggests that the state
should feel relatively free to give entitlements to the poor so long as
68 Bruce Ackerman, Foreword- Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE LJ. 1083 (1983);
Gjerdingen, supra note 11, at 916-17; Schwab, supra note 10, at 1195-96.
69 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being and Public Choice, 57 U. CI. L.
REv. 63 (1990).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
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it can be relatively sure that the poor "value" the entitlements by
their cost, with value measured by willingness to accept money for
foregoing the entitlement, rather than willingness to pay for the en-
titlement in the first place.71 As a matter of welfare economic the-
ory, measures of consumer welfare based on willingness to accept
are neither better nor worse than measures based on willingness to
pay.72
Further, to the extent we have any information about interper-
sonal utility measures, it suggests that the relatively poorer mem-
bers of society derive greater utility from a dollar than do the
relatively wealthier. That proposition may be normative, in the
sense that it cannot be strictly verified within the confines of subjec-
tive value theory, but it is no more normative than the proposition
that the rich and the poor derive equal utility from a dollar, which
drives much of welfare economics today.73 Further, if one is willing
to admit objective criteria of value in addition to information based
on subjective preference, the proposition that the poor benefit more
from each dollar than the rich is empirically verifiable.74
All markets, even simple ones for fungible commodities, are
created and defined in the first instance not by nature, but by State
policy. Before I can sell you something we must be reasonably sure
that the State recognizes my ownership claim, entitles me to sell,
and you to buy. In this sense, an entitlement to, say, health care is
no more idiosyncratic than an entitlement to a parcel of land. Sov-
ereign policy determines who starts out with what. When economic
considerations such as efficiency are used to define the scope of pri-
vate endowment, these endowments may as easily include the right
to health care as the right to land.
71 On this point, see Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and
the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1178-79 (1984).
72 See, e.g., RICHARD JusT, DARRELL HuETI & ANDREW SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 10-11, 84-115 (1982).
73 On the possibility of such comparisons, see AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE
AND MEASUREMENT ch. 12 (1982). On the pervasiveness of interpersonal utility compari-
sons in real world judgments, see Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structurefor Microeconomic
Policy Analysis in our Worse-than-second-best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago
Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 950, 984-85.
74 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 993 (1990); Hovenkamp, supra note 71.
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